Privacy Policy — External Services and My Data
Audience: Mark Myers (internal reference)
Purpose: Documents how third-party services connected to my AI ecosystem handle my data
Effective Date: March 2, 2026
Governing Document: CONSTITUTION.md ("How I Work With AI," v5)
What This Covers
This document tracks every third-party service that Golgi or my broader AI ecosystem connects to, what data each service receives, and what exposure risk each creates. If a service touches my data through an AI-mediated process, it belongs here.
Connected Services
Tier 1: High Integration (Direct Agent Access)
Telegram
What Golgi accesses: Messages sent to/from the bot, group chat messages where the bot is present
What data flows: Full message content (text, images if sent), sender metadata, timestamps
Token scope: Bot API token — can read/send messages in permitted chats, manage bot-specific settings
Retention: Messages persist on Telegram's servers per their policy; bot can access message history within API limits
Risk level: High — primary communication channel. Bot token compromise = impersonation + message history access
Their privacy policy: https://telegram.org/privacy
GitHub
What Golgi accesses: Repositories, code, issues, pull requests, commit history
What data flows: Code content, commit messages, issue/PR text, repository metadata
Token scope: Varies by configuration — potentially repo read/write, issues, PRs
Retention: All data persists on GitHub per their terms; public repos are permanently public
Risk level: Medium — code and project data exposure. Token compromise = unauthorized commits, data exfiltration from private repos
Their privacy policy: https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement
Firebase (Google Cloud)
What Golgi accesses: Firestore database (SMS message queue, contact lists), authentication config
What data flows: SMS message content, phone numbers, contact metadata, delivery status
Token scope: Firebase Admin SDK or service account — Firestore read/write, potentially auth management
Retention: Data persists until explicitly deleted; Firestore has no automatic expiration by default
Risk level: High — contains phone numbers, message content, and contact information. Credential compromise = access to all stored messages and contacts
Their privacy policy: https://firebase.google.com/support/privacy
Vercel
What Golgi accesses: Deployment platform for golgi-sms webhook and helm-app dashboard
What data flows: Source code (deployed functions), environment variables, deployment logs, incoming webhook requests
Token scope: Project-level access for deployments
Retention: Deployment history persists; function logs retained per Vercel's plan limits
Risk level: Medium — webhook endpoints receive inbound SMS data via Twilio. Vercel compromise = access to deployed code and environment secrets
Their privacy policy: https://vercel.com/legal/privacy-policy
Tier 2: Moderate Integration (Periodic or Conditional Access)
Twilio
What Golgi accesses: Inbound SMS messages routed through webhook
What data flows: SMS content, sender phone numbers, carrier metadata, delivery status
Token scope: Account SID + Auth Token for SMS send/receive
Retention: Message logs retained per Twilio's policy (default: available via API for duration of account)
Risk level: Medium-High — handles phone numbers and message content. Token compromise = ability to send SMS from the account, access message logs
Their privacy policy: https://www.twilio.com/en-us/legal/privacy
Google Workspace (Calendar, Gmail, Drive)
What Golgi accesses: Calendar events (read), email content (if configured), Drive files (if configured)
What data flows: Event details, email content, document contents — depends on configured scope
Token scope: OAuth scopes determine access — should be limited to minimum necessary
Retention: Data persists in Google's ecosystem per their terms
Risk level: Medium-High — broad personal and professional data. OAuth token compromise = access to email, calendar, and documents within granted scopes
Their privacy policy: https://policies.google.com/privacy
Tier 3: Planned or Low Integration
CampusESP
Status: Mentioned in workspace context but integration scope TBD
What would flow: Parent/family communication data (must be evaluated carefully for institutional data boundaries)
Risk note: Any CampusESP integration must be evaluated against the institutional data boundary — no student records or institutionally governed data enters personal AI systems
Their privacy policy: Review before any integration
Oura / Apple Health
Status: Potential future integration for health/wellness context
What would flow: Sleep data, activity data, readiness scores, health metrics
Risk level: Low-Medium — personal health data entering AI context. Not institutionally sensitive but personally sensitive
Risk note: Health data entering AI conversations is transmitted to Anthropic's API during processing
Their privacy policies: https://ouraring.com/privacy-policy / https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/
API Token Scope and Access Levels
Principle: Tokens should be scoped to minimum necessary access. Broad tokens (admin, full-access) should be replaced with scoped alternatives where the service supports it.
How My Data Might Be Exposed Through Integrations
Telegram bot token compromise: Attacker could read messages, send messages as the bot, and access conversation history. This is the highest-impact single credential because it's the primary communication channel.
Firebase credential compromise: Access to SMS message queue, phone numbers, contact lists. Could read private messages or inject fake messages into the queue.
Chained compromise: If an attacker gains access to the Mac Mini (SSH, physical, or malware), they have access to all credentials stored under ~/.local-infra/. This is the single point of failure — all service access flows from local credential storage.
Context window leakage: Data from one service (e.g., email content) enters the AI context and is transmitted to Anthropic's API. The data now exists in two places: the originating service and Anthropic's 7-day retention window. A separate policy violation or data breach at either endpoint exposes the data.
Webhook exposure: The golgi-sms Twilio webhook is a publicly accessible endpoint. If not properly authenticated, it could be targeted with spoofed requests.
Risk Tiers Summary
Audit and Revocation Process
Regular Audit (Quarterly)
Emergency Revocation
If a credential is compromised or suspected compromised:
~/.local-infra/ config files or environment variables)How to Cut Access to Any Service
Each service can be disconnected independently:
Revoking a token immediately cuts Golgi's access to that service. No data is lost locally — only the live connection is severed.
Institutional Data Boundary Reminder
Before integrating any new external service, verify:
The boundary is clear: personal and professional data in the AI ecosystem, institutional and student data in institutional systems. No crossover.
*This document is part of the privacy policy suite. See also: PERSONAL_DATA_LOCAL.md, PERSONAL_DATA_AGENTIC.md, PUBLIC_USER_PRIVACY_POLICY.md.*
*Governing document: CONSTITUTION.md ("How I Work With AI," v5)*